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CRA Insights15 November 2026

The CRA Reporting Platform, Two Months In: Two Quiet Version Upgrades, New FAQs, and a Live Vulnerability Test

The CRA Reporting Platform, Two Months In: Two Quiet Version Upgrades, New FAQs, and a Live Vulnerability Test

ENISA's Single Reporting Platform (SRP) has now been live for just over two months, since 11 września 2026 r.. Manufacturers still file an actively exploited vulnerability or severe incident through it under Article 14, routed to ENISA and the CSIRT designated as coordinator under Article 16. Since our last close look, three things have moved: the platform itself, the guidance around it, and, for the first time, a live incident that tested the obligation in public. Here is where things stand on 15 November 2026.

Two version upgrades, no changelog for either

ENISA's SRP hub page carries a single running line noting the platform's current version, and that line has moved twice since launch without an announcement. Our research in late October found it reading that on 20 October 2026 the SRP was upgraded to version 1.2.1, changing how an Assigned Representative (AR) invites a Secondary AR or Backup, with the older method still working "for a short period of time." That note is gone from the page today: it now reads, verbatim, "On 4 November 2026, the CRA SRP was upgraded to version 1.3." The same "1.3" now sits on the cover of the reissued AR User Manual, dated November 2026, with no revision history. Neither upgrade came with release notes, fitting how this page has behaved since before launch: one line, overwritten each time, with no record of what it said before.

Documentation has not kept pace. Four of ENISA's five SRP guidance pages, covering AR registration, notification submission, interface functions and Particularly Exceptional Circumstances (PEC), still carry September timestamps and show no sign of reflecting either version bump. The FAQ moved on its own, more recent, schedule.

What the 15 October FAQ update settled

On 15 October 2026, ENISA added FAQs 34 and 35 and updated a third. New FAQ 34 confirms an AR cannot close their own notification; only the CSIRT Designated as Coordinator (CDaC) can, reached directly or via the notification's "additional note" field. New FAQ 35 addresses Article 17(5), under which ENISA may add a publicly known, already-fixed vulnerability to the EU Vulnerability Database (EUVD), but only "in agreement with the manufacturer." ENISA may contact the manufacturer to ask, and separately, as a CVE Numbering Authority, can help assign a CVE ID on request; neither step is automatic. Updated FAQ 24 confirms the interface stays English-only, with other languages "under review" and no date given. One caveat: FAQ 35 concerns Article 15(1), the CRA's voluntary channel, which the AR User Manual says is still "not available in the initial release," with no date set. Everything live today runs through the mandatory Article 14 path only.

A live vulnerability tested the obligation in public

On 21 October 2026, the European Commission, ENISA, CERT-EU, Europol's EC3 and the EU CSIRT network issued a joint statement on two critical PHP flaws, CVE-2026-109618 oraz CVE-2026-109619, allowing unauthenticated remote code execution; PHP's security team shipped fixes the same day. What matters here is less the flaws than what the statement told manufacturers next, stating plainly that "as of 11 September 2026, manufacturers of hardware and software products must report actively exploited vulnerabilities… through the CRA Single Reporting platform, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/2847." It asked organisations to check every PHP-based application they run, including PHP bundled where it isn't obvious, pointing to an NCSC-NL tracking list as a starting point. It is the first widely visible case since launch where a live, named vulnerability and the Article 14 duty lined up in public at the same time.

Three points this kind of story still gets wrong

  • The manufacturer cannot delay the 24-hour, 72-hour or 14-day filing. Those clocks run from the moment of awareness, and nothing, not an outage, not an undocumented version change, pauses them.
  • It is the receiving CSIRT, not the manufacturer, that may delay onward dissemination to other CSIRTs, under the delegated act the Commission adopted on 11 December 2025, and only on cybersecurity grounds.
  • Under art. 16(2), a manufacturer may flag narrow conditions inside the 72-hour notification. That restricts what ENISA sees until the coordinating CSIRT releases the full notification; it is a content restriction, not a timing extension.
Status at publication, 15 November 2026

The SRP runs on platform version 1.3 as of 4 November 2026; ENISA has published no release notes for it or for the 1.2.1 upgrade that preceded it on 20 October 2026, so neither change can be independently confirmed beyond the version number itself. Voluntary reporting under Article 15 and any SRP API remain unavailable, with no date given for either. Four of five AR guidance pages still carry September 2026 timestamps.

If your product uses PHP anywhere in its stack, including as a bundled dependency, treat this as a prompt to check your own inventory now, rather than after an advisory names you. Our Narzędzie do klasyfikacji confirms whether a product falls under the CRA and which class it sits in; our przewodnik zgłaszania covers what each notification stage needs; and our SBOM i analizator podatności can surface a dependency like PHP before a joint statement does it for you. We will revisit the version 1.3 changelog and the Article 15 launch date once ENISA documents either.

Published 15 November 2026 · CRA Insights. Part of the CRA insights blog on cyberresilienceact.eu.